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I. INTRODUCTION
Oh, I have slipped the surly bonds of earth
And danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings
Sunward I've climbed, and joined the tumbling mirth
Of sun-split clouds-and done a hundred things
You have not dreamed of-wheeled and soared
and swung
High in the sunlit silence.'
* Ms. Goodman is an associate in the aviation group of Gardere & Wynne,
Dallas, Texas. Prior to joining Gardere & Wynne, Ms. Goodman worked for 17
years as a professional pilot, including eight years with Continental Airlines as a
B727 pilot and check airman.
** Mr. Davis is a partner in the aviation group of Gardere & Wynne, specializ-
ing in aviation related litigation.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Michael Newman, an as-
sociate in the aviation group of Gardere & Wynne, in the preparation of this
Article.
I John Gillespie Magee,Jr., High Flight, in FAVORITE POEMS OLD & NEW 203 (H.
Ferris ed. 1957).
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T O MOST PEOPLE, flying invokes visions of floating freelyamong the clouds with earthly bonds and restrictions left far
behind. Although this was true in aviation's early years, as air
traffic has increased, aviation has become burdened with strict
regulations and restrictions that prevent pilots from traveling
where, when, and how they desire.2 Foremost among these re-
strictions is the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system which confines
aircraft to routes and altitudes dictated by FAA air traffic
controllers.3
Recently, a new concept of air traffic control has emerged,
called "free flight," that will allow pilots to recoup some of the
freedom they have lost over the years.4 The free flight concept
is a result of advances in technology that provide more precise
aircraft navigation and tracking than traditional means. Under
the new system, pilots will choose and alter their flight paths and
altitudes with few constraints. Rather than requesting a clear-
ance to change altitude or direction, pilots will merely advise
ATC of the change. ATC will only interfere if a conflict devel-
ops. In addition, the mandatory separation distances between
aircraft will be reduced.5
The transition to free flight is occurring while the skies are
becoming increasingly crowded with faster, more complex air-
craft. As the turn of the century approaches, international air
traffic is expected to increase at a rate of over six percent per
year.' By the year 2000, scheduled carriers will carry as many as
1.72 billion passengers.7 This increase in air traffic, combined
with the reduced separation requirements and greater flexibility
that will accompany free flight, could result in an unprece-
dented number of aircraft accident fatalities. To prevent such a
2 See generally 14 C.F.R. ch. I. (1996) (regulations promulgated by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and Department of Transportation governing air-
craft, airspace, pilots, and carriers).
3 The air traffic control system is operated by the FAA. Through the Federal
Aviation Act, Congress has directed the FAA to develop the navigable airspace
and "assign by regulation or order the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the
safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace." 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103(b) (1)
(West Supp. 1996). The FAA thus has a duty to prescribe regulations for "navi-
gating, protecting and identifying aircraft." Id. § 40103(b) (2) (A).
4 Michael A. Dornheim, Equipment Will Not Prevent Free Flight, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 31, 1995, at 46.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 21-35.
6 Pierre Sparaco, Strong Traffic Growth Foreseen for 1996-2000, AVATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Dec. 2, 1996, at 35.
7 Id.
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result, pilots and controllers must share responsibility for flight
safety under the new system.
Courts can help ensure that pilots and ATC work together by
imposing tort liability proportionate to each party's relative re-
sponsibility for aircraft accidents. This will require that courts
abandon the pilot-in-command (PIC) concept in tort litigation.
The pilot-in-command rule gives the pilot in charge of the flight
the final authority and ultimate responsibility for the safe opera-
tion of his aircraft. To the extent that it gives the pilot final
authority for the operation of the aircraft, the rule is both logi-
cal and necessary to promote flight safety. After all, only the
pilot has access to the controls of his aircraft. Unfortunately,
courts have extended the rule to tort litigation to impose full
liability on pilots for aircraft accidents when other parties' negli-
gence also contributed to the harm. In particular, some courts
have applied the PIC concept to absolve ATC of liability in cases
in which ATC could have prevented an accident by using due
care.
Although the PIC concept originated fifty years ago, it has sur-
vived significant changes in technology. In fact, while technol-
ogy has made it increasingly easier for ATC to protect air
travelers, the FAA still tries to place full responsibility on the
flight crew anytime the pilot has even limited control over his
destiny. The FAA is particularly adept at avoiding liability for
accidents involving aircraft operating in visual flight conditions
because some courts have held that ATC is not liable to warn the
pilot of dangers of which the pilot should be aware.8
This philosophy raises serious questions regarding the safety
of free flight because free flight transfers additional responsibil-
ity to the pilot. Free flight is analogous to visual flight in that
pilots have more information and control than they do under
instrument flight rules. Utilizing new technology, pilots operat-
ing under free flight will have greater responsibility for traffic
separation because they will have greater access to information.9
In essence, the increase in information available to the pilot will
shift a portion of the responsibility for aircraft separation from
the ATC facility to the cockpit. Air traffic controllers will, to
some extent, become air traffic managers. The courts should
8 See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
9 See Free Flight? First, Free Air-Traffic Control COLO. SPRINGS GAZETrE TELE-
GRAPH, Apr. 9, 1996, at B4.
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not let ATC use this shift in information and control as a way to
avoid responsibility for safety.
This Article will explore the potential impact of free flight on
the balance of liability between controllers and pilots. First, it
will explore the transition of the ATC system from a positive
control environment to the free flight concept. The Article will
then review the law concerning liability of pilots and air traffic
controllers under the current system and discuss the potential
impact of free flight on their respective liabilities. Finally, the
Article will argue that, to preserve aviation safety under the new
system, courts must abandon the last vestiges of the pilot-in-com-
mand concept and require controllers to share responsibility for
the safety of all flights that they control or monitor.
II. TRANSITION FROM POSITIVE CONTROL TO
FREE FLIGHT
The primary purpose of the air traffic control system is "to
prevent a collision between aircraft and to organize and expe-
dite the flow of traffic." 10 Air traffic control operates twenty-four
hours a day, 365 days per year, handling two aircraft per second
and moving 1.5 million people per day to their destinations.1"
Pilots rely on ATC for weather information, traffic advisories,
and flight guidance. Whether they are operating under instru-
ment flight rules (IFR) or visual flight rules (VFR), pilots are
more often than not in controlled airspace and in contact with
an air traffic controller.12
The current air traffic control system is based on the concept
of positive control. Pilots are required to follow the clearances
10 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ORDER No. 7110.65J, AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROL § 2-1-1 (1995) [hereinafter AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS' MANUAL
or ATCM].
I David Hinson, FAA Administrator, Remarks on the Nation's Air Traffic Con-
trol System (Oct. 17, 1995), available in 1995 WL 614511.
12 VFR flight requires basic weather minimums of flight visibility and distance
from clouds. See 14 C.F.R § 91.155 (a) (1996). Generally, the VFR pilot must be
able to readily see other aircraft and obstacles. Id. § 91.155.
The pilot must operate under instrument flight rules when visibility is limited
by fog or clouds and whenever an airplane is in Class A airspace. Id. (basic VFR
weather minimums); id. § 91.135 (flight in Class A airspace must be conducted
under IFR).
Pilots operating VFR are not required to file a flight plan, and, except when
they are in certain classes of controlled airspace, they do not have to maintain
contact with ATC. See id. §§ 91.151-.159. In contrast, to operate IFR, the pilot
must first file an IFR flight plan and receive a clearance from ATC. Id. § 91.173.
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issued by ATC whether they are operating under visual or instru-
ment flight rules,13 but IFR pilots are particularly restricted by
ATC. A pilot on an IFR flight plan has, in essence, a contract
with ATC. The pilot files a flight plan and adheres to the clear-
ances provided by ATC. ATC, in turn, keeps the aircraft sepa-
rated from other IFR traffic. 4 If a pilot violates a clearance limit
or enters controlled airspace without authorization, even inad-
vertently, he risks serious consequences ranging from a fine to a
revocation of his license.
The positive control system is inherently inefficient because it
does not permit optimum use of the available airspace. Prior to
embarking on an IFR flight, the pilot must file a flight plan in
which he requests his chosen route and altitude.1 5 The choices
are limited. Altitudes are restricted based upon the direction of
flight,16 and routes are generally restricted to designated airways
orjetways. 17 Moreover, ATC may not always issue the requested
clearance. Rather, if traffic flow so requires, ATC may dictate
that the pilot fly an alternate route or altitude, or even delay
departure. Because the route and altitude chosen by ATC often
are not the most efficient for the particular flight and aircraft,
time and fuel are wasted. 8
Until recently, technology has mandated that these restric-
tions remain in place despite their inefficiencies. For example,
aircraft have been monitored by ATC through radar tracking,
which can be limited by interference from terrain, weather, and
atmospheric phenomena.1 9 To compensate for these limita-
tions, ATC must be able to expect the aircraft to follow a pre-
scribed route. In addition, navigation has been based upon the
is FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., AERONAUTICAL INFORMA-
TION MANUAL § 4-4-9 (1995) [hereinafter AIM].
14 Bruce D. Nordwall, Free Right: ATC Model for the Next 50 Years, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., July 31, 1995, at 38.
15 14 C.F.R. § 91.173 (1996).
16 See id. § 91.179 (IFR cruising altitude or flight level).
17 "Airways" are routes designated from 1200 feet above the ground (agl) up to
but not including 18,000 feet above sea level (msl). AIM, supra note 13, § 5-3-4.
Jetways, or jet routes, consist of those routes from 18,000 feet to flight level 450.
14 C.F.R. § 5-3-4 (2). Airways are depicted on Low Altitude Enroute Charts, and
jetways are shown on High Altitude Enroute Charts. Id.
18 For example, turbine-engine aircraft bum substantially less fuel at higher
altitudes, and wind speed and direction change significantly with altitude. Pilots
consider both of these factors in choosing the optimum altitude for a given
flight, but ATC requirements may dictate using a different altitude or flight level.
Id. § 91.179.
19 AIM, supra note 13, § 1-2-1 b(a).
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use of ground based navigational aids, such as VHF omni-direc-
tional ranges (VOR) and nondirectional radio beacons (NDB).
These facilities have limited range and are subject to interfer-
ence." Consequently, pilots must transition from station to sta-
tion along a designated route rather than fly directly from their
departure point to the destination airport.
Recent developments in aviation technology, however, have
significantly improved the precision and reliability of air naviga-
tion. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS), a satel-
lite system which provides highly accurate aircraft position and
velocity information, allows pilots to fly direct routes because
the system is not restricted by range.2 1 Another development,
the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) sys-
tem will enhance the accuracy of tracking aircraft flight paths.
The ADS-B depends on input from another navigation system,
such as a GPS, to monitor aircraft positions and transmit the
information to controllers and pilots. 22 This system provides
much more accurate and reliable information about aircraft lo-
cation than does the traditional radar system.23
These technological advances have led to the development of
"free flight."2 4 Free flight is premised upon the use of modern
technology to transfer control of aviation from ground-based
personnel to the aviation user. Aircraft separation under free
flight is based on the concept of two airspace zones, protected
and alert, the size of which depend on the aircraft's speed, per-
formance characteristics, and communications, navigation, and
surveillance equipment. 25 The smaller zone closest to the air-
craft, referred to as the protected zone, can never meet the pro-
20 Id. §§ 1-1-2, 1-1-3. VORs are subject to line-of-sight and range restrictions.
Id. § 1-1-3. NDBs are subject to disturbances from such factors as lightning and
precipitation static, and are also range limited. Id. § 1-1-2 d.
21 Id. § 1-1-22.
22 Bruce D. Nordwall, Free Flight Could Stall Without Key Data Link, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., June 3, 1996, at 28.
23 Id.
24 See Free Flight or Free-for-Al?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at 4 (discussing con-
cept of free flight as shifting responsibility from ATC to pilots); Matthew L. Wald,
FAA Putting Pilots in the Driver's Seat; Technology Will Enable Crews Instead of Control-
lers to Determine Routes, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Mar. 16, 1996, at Al (refer-
ring to free flight as "radically different concept of air traffic control"); David
Hughes, Free Flight Sparks International Debate, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July
31, 1995, at 44 (discussing international potential for free flight).
25 RTCA, INC., REPORT OF THE RTCA BOARD OF DIRECTORS' SELECT COMMITTEE
ON FREE FLIGHT 7 (1995) [hereinafter RTCA TASK FORCE REPORT].
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tected zone of another aircraft. 6 The alert zone extends well
beyond the protected zone. Aircraft that free fly will be
equipped with a receiver that automatically signals a conflict
with another aircraft's protected zone. 7 ATC will rely on a
software package, called a "conflict probe," to detect potential
contacts between aircraft alert zones.28 If an aircraft's alert zone
contacts that of another, the pilot and/or air traffic controller
will determine if a course or altitude correction is required. Ul-
timately, free flight will enable the reduction of separation dis-
tances between IFR aircraft. 9
Although air traffic controllers will be essential to the safety of
the free flight system, their responsibilities will eventually shift
from controlling to monitoring flights, intervening only as nec-
essary to head off a potential problem. 30 With free flight, more
reliance will be placed on pilots and navigation aids.3 ' Pilots will
have access to more information and more freedom to maneu-
ver than they have under the current system, particularly in IFR
conditions. Although ATC will have the final say in issues of
traffic separation, pilots or carrier dispatchers will choose the
route, speed, and altitude for the flight. This flexibility will only
be restricted as necessary to ensure traffic separation, when traf-
fic density at busy airports or in congested airspace requires, to
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Bill Sweetman, Accelerating the ATC Revolution; Air Traffic Control AIR TRANsp.
WORLD, May 1995, at 57.
29 Currently, aircraft are separated by one to two thousand feet vertically and
five miles horizontally. J. Lynn Lunsford, FAA Plan May Extend Pilot Contro4" But
Routing Proposal Raises Safety Question, DUALAs MORNING NEWS, Sept. 24, 1995, at
1A.
One of the goals of free flight is to reduce separation distances. Ultimately, the
RTCA task force envisions a reduction in separation to one nautical mile horizon-
tally and one thousand feet vertically. RTCA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25,
at 34.
30 Nordwall, supra note 14, at 38.
31 Free Flight? First, Free Air-traffic Control supra note 9.
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prevent unauthorized entry into special use airspace,3" and to
ensure safety.33
Proponents of free flight assert that this increased freedom
will allow airlines to save time and fuel without sacrificing
safety.3 4 Others argue that "any benefits gained will be lost
when an airplane reaches its destination."3 5 Regardless of its
other implications, the advent of free flight will change the rela-
tionship between ATC and IFR pilots. For the new system to
work, the courts must clarify the rules governing liability of pi-
lots and air traffic controllers.
III. TRADITIONAL RULES GOVERNING LIABILITY OF
PILOTS AND ATC FOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
Although liability for aircraft accidents is "determined by the
ordinary rules of negligence and due care,"36 the specific duties
of both controllers and pilots are dictated by federal law.3 7 The
FAA has set forth the duties and responsibilities of pilots in the
Federal Aviation Administration regulations (FARs), s which
have the force and effect of law.39 In addition, the FAA pub-
lishes safety information in the Aeronautical Information Man-
32 Special Use Airspace is "airspace wherein activities must be confined be-
cause of their nature, or wherein limitations are imposed upon aircraft opera-
tions that are not a part of those activities, or both." AIM, supra note 13, § 34-
1 (a). It includes Prohibited Areas (established for security purposes), Restricted
Areas (may contain hazards such as artillery firing, aerial gunnery, or guided mis-
siles), Warning Areas (areas in international airspace which may contain poten-
tially hazardous activities), Military Operations Areas (military training areas),
and Alert Areas (contain a high volume of training or unusual type of aerial
activity). Id. §§ 3-4-3 to -6.
33 RTCA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 7.
34 Proponents of free flight say that it will increase safety and save airlines bil-
lions of dollars a year. See Jeffrey Leib, Pilot Works to Update Air Traffic Control
DENVER POST, Aug. 25, 1996, at 8 (interview of Michael Baiada, United Airlines
Pilot).
35 Craig A. Burzych, Traffic Jam in the Skies, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996,
at 26. There are, of course, a limited number of airports with a limited number
of runways. Unless the airlines are willing to adjust and coordinate their sched-
ules, aircraft will reach the same destinations at the same time, and any fuel and
time savings will be lost in holding patterns. Id.
3 United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
828 (1960).
37 Rodriquez v. United States, 823 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1987).
38 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.1-.201, 91.1-.193 (1996).
39 Tilley v. United States, 375 F.2d 678, 680 (4th Cir. 1967). Some courts have
held that a violation of these regulations is negligence per se. E.g., Gatenby v.
Altoona Aviation Corp., 407 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1968).
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ual and in Advisory Circulars.' These publications provide
evidence of the standard of care among pilots. 41 The duties of
controllers are delineated in FAA regulations and the FAA's Air
Traffic Control Manual.4'
The pilot is ultimately responsible for the safety of his aircraft
because only he has access to the flight controls.43 Like other
professionals, pilots are held to the standard of care of ordinary
competent persons acting in the same profession. 4 With pro-
fessional pilots, the standard of care is demanding because even
a slight breach of the pilot's duty can result in disastrous conse-
quences.45 Of course, before a pilot is legally responsible for
the operation of his aircraft, he must have known, or be held to
40 In re N-500L Cases, 517 F. Supp. 825, 833 (D.P.R. 1981).
41 Id.
42 Dyer v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 1266, 1275 (W.D. Mich. 1982); 14 C.F.R.
§ 65.45(a) (1996) ("An air traffic control tower operator shall perform his duties
in accordance with . . .the procedures and practices prescribed in air traffic
control manuals of the FAA .... ").
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides the means to overcome the
traditional sovereign immunity extended to the government. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), affid sub nom. United States v.
Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
43 E.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 192 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955 (1963); First of Am. Bank-Cent. v. United States, 639 F. Supp. 446, 454
(W.D. Mich. 1986).
This rule is predicated on international and domestic regulations. See Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, Annex 6, 3.2 (4th ed. 1990)
("The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the operation and safety of the
aeroplane and for the safety of all persons on board, during flight time"); 14
C.F.R § 91.3(a) (1996) ("The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsi-
ble for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.").
The pilot's responsibility arises from his or her special expertise and access
to information. R.I.R. Abeyratne, Negligence of the Aircraft Commander and Bad Air-
manship-New Frontiers, 12 AIR LAw 3, 5 (1987).
45 As one court noted:
[T]here are activities in which the degree of professional skill
which must be required is so high and the potential consequences
of the smallest departure from that high standard are so serious
that one failure to perform in accordance with those standards is
enough to justify dismissal. The passenger-carrying airline pilot,
the scientist operating the nuclear reactor, the chemist in charge of
research into the possible effect of, for example, thalidomide, the
driver of the Manchester to London express, the driver of an articu-
lated lorry full of sulphuric acid, are all in the situation in which
one failure to maintain the proper standard of professional skill
can bring about a major disaster ....
Taylor v. Alidair Ltd., 1976 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 420, 423, quoted in Abeyratne, supra
note 44, at 6.
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have known, the facts that were material to the aircraft's safe
operation.46 He is charged with that knowledge which in the
exercise of the highest degree of care he should have known.47
This includes knowledge of the FARs, the AIM, weather condi-
tions along his route of flight, the terrain over which he will fly,
and the procedures for and limitations of his particular air-
craft.48 Further, the pilot must constantly remain aware of dan-
gers that are discernible with his eyes and/or instruments. 49
Air traffic controllers are responsible for providing separation
to IFR aircraft carrying hundreds of passengers at speeds ap-
proaching the sound barrier. Consequently, the obligations im-
posed on controllers are exacting.50 The specific duties of air
traffic controllers are set forth in ATC manuals, which require
controllers51 to separate aircraft and issue safety alerts as
needed.52 The Air Traffic Controllers' Manual (ATCM) in-
structs the controller that "[t]he issuance of a safety alert is a
first priority ... once the controller observes and recognizes a
situation of unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or
other aircraft."5 3 ATC duties are not, however, outlined exclu-
sively in the ATCM. Rather, controllers have responsibilities
that arise from the reliance pilots place on ATC.54 This reliance
requires ATC to warn pilots of dangers apparent to the control-
ler that are not, in the exercise of due care, apparent to the
pilot.-5
4 American Airlines, 418 F.2d at 193.
47 Redhead v. United States, 686 F.2d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1203 (1983).
48 In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport on Aug. 2, 1985, 720 F. Supp.
1258, 1280 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (weather conditions), cert. denied sub nom. Connors
v. United States, 502 U.S. 899 (1991); First of Am. Bank-Cent. v. United States,
639 F. Supp. 446, 453 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (advisory circulars and AIM); McDaniel
v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 910, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (terrain).
49 See, e.g., Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226-27 (9th Cir. 1972).
50 Himmler v. United States, 474 F. Supp. 914, 928 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (noting that
in an air traffic control room it is always possible that a tragic accident may occur
"in a matter of seconds if controllers who assume a high responsibility, relax from
constantly overseeing an aircraft to promote its safety in flight").
51 E.g., Rodriquez v. United States, 823 F.2d 735, 740 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding
violation of ATCM provision is evidence of negligence); Springer v. United
States, 641 F. Supp. 913, 936 (D.S.C. 1986) (holding FAA had duty to conform
conduct to its manuals); Himmler, 474 F. Supp. at 941.
52 ATCM, supra note 10, § 2-1-2.
53 Id. § 2-1-6 n.1.
54 Webb v. United States, 840 F. Supp. 1484, 1514-15 (D. Utah 1994).
55 Id. at 1515.
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Cases dealing with the respective duties of pilots and air traffic
controllers "are frequently plagued with what seems to be a par-
adox."56 Although the pilot is ultimately responsible for the
safety of his aircraft and passengers, air traffic controllers also
must perform certain duties to ensure aviation safety.57 In fact,
"[t]he responsibilities of the pilot and the controller intention-
ally overlap in many areas providing a degree of redundancy."58
A majority of courts recognize that the duties of pilots and con-
trollers are concurrent, and impose liability accordingly. A mi-
nority of courts, however, ignore the legal duties imposed upon
air traffic controllers and rely on the pilot-in-command concept
to place sole responsibility on the pilot anytime the danger that
caused the accident was one of which the pilot should have been
aware.5 9 Further, even courts that do recognize that the duties
are concurrent sometimes place full responsibility on the pilot
for accidents that occur in visual conditions.60
A. THE "PILOT-IN-COMMAND" CONCEPT
The "pilot-in-command concept originated in the military and
served as the foundation for [the] responsibility assumed by mil-
itary pilots."6 1 Based on the premise that only the pilot-in-com-
mand of an aircraft knows his responsibilities and limitations, it
places primary responsibility for the operation of the aircraft on
the pilot in charge of the flight.12
56 Richardson v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 921, 925 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
17 Id.
58 AIM, supra note 13, § 5-5-le.
59 See Andrew J. Dilk, Aviation Tort Litigation Against the United States-Judicial
Inroads on the Pilot-In-Command Concept, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 797, 805 (1987).
60 E.g., Hamilton v. United States, 497 F.2d 370,376-77 (9th Cir. 1974).
61 Dilk, supra note 59, at 800.
62 Id. at 797, 800. Dilk argues that the pilot-in-command concept is "histori-
cally at the backbone of the pilot/air traffic control navigation system." Id. at
797. However, it should be noted that since Dilk is counsel for the FAA, Dilk has
a definite interest in promoting the pilot-in-command concept. The PIC concept
is one of several methods the FAA uses to avoid liability. The United States has
also argued that, under the discretionary functions exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), controllers cannot be held liable for their failure to issue a
traffic advisory. Frutin v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 234, 236 (D. Mass. 1991).
However, as the court in Frutin noted, ATC's primary duty is traffic separation.
Id. at 238. Thus, once an aircraft makes radio contact with the controller, the
government's role rises to an operational level and the controller must issue traf-
fic advisories. Id. at 236-37.
Another way the FAA tries to avoid liability is by drafting the rules by which
they are judged. See Kevin N. Courtois, "Standards and Practices" The Judiciay's
Role in Promoting Safety in the Air Traffic Control System, 55J. AIR L. & CoM. 1117,
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Traditionally, courts relied on the pilot-in-command concept
to place sole liability for aircraft accidents on the pilot, regard-
less of the actions of ATC. 63 Courts reasoned that the ATC sys-
tem relies on the assumption that pilots will always know and
follow the FARs, and that ATC is not required to foresee pilot
negligence.64 Thus, the courts essentially allowed controllers to
assume that pilots would not make mistakes. If a pilot failed to
see another aircraft, flew into hazardous weather, or failed to
maintain terrain clearance, only the pilot was held legally liable
for the consequences.65 Controllers were absolved of liability
simply because the pilot did not follow the regulations, even in
cases where prompt attention and warning by ATC might have
prevented the accident.
Some courts still follow the traditional pilot-in-command con-
cept and hold that the controller has no obligation to warn the
pilot of any danger of which the pilot should be aware.66 For
1151 (1990) (noting that "[t]he problem with using FAA procedures as the stan-
dard of care is that the agency then becomes both the source and the object of
regulation.").
63 See, e.g., Redhead v. United States, 686 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating
ATC has no duty to warn pilot of situations of which pilot should be aware based
on his training, experience, and personal observations), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203
(1983); Hamilton, 497 F.2d at 376 (holding ATC had no duty to inform two air-
craft of other's position in VFR conditions); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335
F.2d 379, 389 (9th Cir.) (holding crew of aircraft was responsible for separation
of aircraft in visual conditions), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
64 E.g., Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871, 878 (10th
Cir. 1984) (stating that ATC has right to assume that pilots know and follow
FARs), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986); Pierce v. United States, 718 F.2d 825,
830 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that ATC is not required to foresee negligent acts of
pilots); Webb v United States, 840 F. Supp. 1484, 1514 (D. Utah 1994).
65 See, e.g., Somlo v. United States, 416 F.2d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding
ATC's failure to give pilot warning of local icing was not proximate cause of acci-
dent because pilot was negligent in bringing aircraft into area of known icing),
cert. denied, 397 U.S 989 (1970); Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 471, 486
(W.D. Wash. 1975) (finding ATC not liable for failure to warn pilot of presence
of terrain); Neff v. United States, 420 F.2d 115, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding
clearance for takeoff into thunderstorm did not warrant pilot's disregard of ap-
parent signs of danger), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1066 (1970).
66 See, e.g., Schuler v. United States, 868 F.2d 195, 197 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding
controller was not negligent for failing to keep pilot, who was operating with one
engine, informed of status of runway because in VFR conditions primary respon-
sibility for safe operation of aircraft remains with pilot); Kack v. United States,
570 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding controller was not liable for crash
caused by wake turbulence because pilot was primarily responsible for safe opera-
tion of aircraft under VFR, regardless of traffic clearance); Thurston v. United
States, 888 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Utah 1995) (holding controllers were not
negligent in assisting VFR pilot who crashed into mountainous terrain because
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example, courts have held that a pilot flying in VFR conditions
cannot expect ATC to advise him of terrain clearance because
the VFR pilot is able to see the ground while the controller can-
not determine the airplane's height above the ground without
some difficulty. 67 Likewise, some courts put the sole responsibil-
ity for traffic separation in VFR conditions on the pilot under
the "see and be seen" concept.68 The "see and be seen" rule is
based upon the reasoning that, in VFR conditions, the pilot is
able to see and avoid other aircraft, and if he is not on an IFR
flight plan, he is free to maneuver at will.6 9
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE PIC CONCEPT
Application of the pilot-in-command concept in tort litigation
is inimical to safety because it destroys one of ATC's incentives
to use due care.70 In addition, the premise is inconsistent with
the realities of modem aviation. The pilot-in-command concept
assumes that only the pilot is responsible for all of the factors
that ensure the safety of flight, such as preflight planning and
evaluation of the weather. 71 This view might have been realistic
when Orville and Wilbur Wright first flew at Kitty Hawk, but in
today's environment it is simply not logical. In the early days of
aviation, the pilot was responsible for planning the flight, load-
ing the airplane, checking the weather, and even maintaining
controllers had no duty to warn pilot of condition of which pilot should already
have been aware).
67 See Cappello v. Duncan Aircraft Sales of Fla., Inc., 79 F.3d 1465, 1470 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996); McDaniel v. United States, 553 F. Supp.
910, 913-16 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
In Cappello, the airplane crashed into a mountain shortly after takeoff while the
pilot was waiting for his IFR flight plan. The airplane was visible on ATC radar,
but the controller turned his back to the radar scope to perform a secondary
duty. Although the controller could have issued a warning that would have pre-
vented the accident if he had monitored his radar, the Sixth Circuit held that
ATC was not negligent because the aircraft was in visual conditions and not
"under the control" of ATC at the time of impact. Cappe//o, 79 F.3d at 1474.
68 E.g., Coatney v. Berkshire, 500 F.2d 290, 292 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding con-
troller not negligent for failing to observe and warn of impending mid-air
collision).
69 Id. Courts find support for this position in the federal aviation regulations
which require that, when weather conditions permit, the pilot must see and avoid
other aircraft. 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (1996).
70 See Courtois, supra note 62, at 1117-20. Courtois explains that the judiciary
can affect the safety of the system because judicial decisions influence the con-
duct of members of society. Id. at 1120.
71 Dilk, supra note 59, at 800.
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the aircraft. Air traffic control (to the extent that it existed at
all) was not necessary because all flights were visual.
Today, " [t] he interrelationship existing between [a] pilot and
ground personnel can best be characterized as one requiring
extensive cooperation."72 The modem pilot relies on a great
many other people to assist in ensuring the safety of his passen-
gers. Highly trained technicians maintain the airplane; licensed
dispatchers plan the flight; certified load-planners determine
the weight and balance; aviation weather reporting stations ana-
lyze and report the weather; and ATC provides clearances, in-
structions, and traffic separation. A division of responsibility
also exists inside the cockpit. The days are long gone that the
captain of the airplane acted alone and unassisted. Modem
cockpits are governed through crew resource management, with
a division of responsibilities and input from each crew mem-
ber.75 The pilot in command is thus dependent on other mem-
bers of his crew, just as the crew generally is dependent upon
the performance of other participants in the air transport sys-
tem, including the ATC.
Rigid application of the pilot-in-command concept in cases in-
volving ATC and pilots ignores these modem realities. Pilots
rely on ATC for traffic separation, weather information, and
warnings of dangerous conditions. This reliance is justified be-
cause air traffic controllers have access to radar, computers, and
radio communications with which to monitor the position of the
aircraft relative to other traffic, terrain, and hazardous weather.
While the pilot's view is restricted to what he can ascertain from
his instruments and his limited view from the cockpit, the con-
troller is able to determine the airplane's exact location and dis-
tance from other aircraft and terrain. Moreover, ATC is usually
much more familiar with local conditions than is the pilot.
C. RECOGNITION OF CONCURRENT RESPONSIBILITY
Because either the air traffic controller's negligence, the pi-
lot's negligence, or the negligence of both may be the proxi-
mate cause of an accident, a trier of fact should be allowed to
apportion fault if state law otherwise allows. The majority of
courts recognize this and hold that air traffic controllers and
pilots have concurrent obligations to prevent harm, whether the
72 Richardson v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 921, 925 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
73 See CAPTAIN ROBERT N. BUCK, THE PILOT'S BURDEN: FLIGHT SAFETY AND THE
RooTs OF PILOT ERROR 205 (1994).
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aircraft is operating in VFR or IFR conditions.74 This shared
burden requires controllers to remain vigilant for signs of dan-
ger, perform the duties set forth in the Air Traffic Control Man-
ual, and, in some cases, to go beyond the duties delineated by
the manual. This is consistent with traditional doctrines of neg-
ligence which require that even when an individual has no legal
duty to act, once he undertakes to do so, he must exercise rea-
sonable care.75 Thus, where danger is obvious to a controller
communicating with a pilot, although the danger should also be
apparent to the pilot, the controller must act to prevent harm.76
If the responsibility of pilots and ATC is concurrent, the allo-
cation of liability should be-and often is-determined by their
respective access to information.7 7 Where the controller is in
the best position to observe danger, he should be held liable for
harm caused by his failure to warn the pilot.7 On the other
hand, where the information is more readily accessible to the
74 See In re Greenwood Air Crash, 924 F. Supp. 1518, 1538 (S.D. Ind. 1995)
(stating "the more reasoned and prevailing view is that the ATC and the pilot
have concurrent duties to maintain separation of aircraft"); see also Mattschei v.
United States, 600 F.2d 205, 208 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding "duty to exercise due
care to avoid accidents is a concurrent one").
75 See, e.g., Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting
that "government's duty to provide services with due care to airline pilots... may
rest upon general pilot reliance on government" for those services); Ingham v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.) (stating "when the govern-
ment undertakes to perform services, which in the absence of specific legislation
would not be required, it will, nevertheless, be liable if these activities are per-
formed negligently"), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
76 E.g., Stork v. United States, 430 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding
controller was negligent for granting clearance for takeoff where visibility was 0
to 165 feet despite fact that pilot was completely aware of weather situation);
United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding that
although controller had already issued one wake turbulence warning, he was neg-
ligent for failing to issue second warning when controller saw pilot begin takeoff
roll); Rudelson v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1101, 1107-08 (C.D. Cal. 1977)
(holding ATC liable for failure to scan VFR traffic pattern, and warn aircraft of
presence of another, despite fact that pilots should have seen each other).
77 See Gili 429 F.2d at 1077; Richardson v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 921, 926
(N.D. Cal. 1974) (stating "the respective duties of pilot and ATC relates to the
ability of the former to perceive a potential danger without assistance from the
latter"); see also First of Am. Bank-Cent. v. United States, 639 F. Supp. 446, 454
(W.D. Mich. 1986) (noting that the "'see and avoid' responsibility logically rests
with the pilot ... because he is generally in a superior position to see other
aircraft").
78 For example, controllers have been found negligent for failing to warn air-
craft of wake turbulence because the controller is in a better physical position for
observation. See Gi4 429 F.2d at 1077 (discussing Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d
870 (5th Cir. 1968)).
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pilot, greater responsibility should be placed on the airman. As
technology provides one or the other with greater information,
the balance of responsibility should shift toward the party with
more information.
Development of new weather reporting systems provides one
example of such a shift in responsibility. FAA personnel, both
air traffic controllers and flight service station personnel, have a
duty to advise pilots of hazardous weather conditions. 79 The
controller should not, however, be held liable for failing to relay
information already known to the pilot.80 Until recently, pilots
and controllers generally had equal access to data indicating the
presence of windshear and microbursts. Recent changes in
technology have altered the balance of information. Through
Terminal Doppler Radar Weather Radar Systems (TDWR),
tower personnel now have access to real-time low altitude wind-
shear information. This information is available to the pilot
only if it is relayed by air traffic control.8" Thus, a controller
who negligently fails to forward a windshear advisory to a pilot,
or worse yet, conveys inaccurate information, should be held lia-
ble for an accident caused by a windshear encounter.8 2
Similarly, responsibility for traffic separation depends on the
relative information available to ATC and the pilot. The infor-
mation available to the pilot and his duties depend, in part, on
whether he is operating in instrument or visual conditions.
When in IFR conditions, the pilot must rely on air traffic control
to provide traffic separation, and his responsibility for avoiding
collisions is generally limited to compliance with the clearances
and instructions of ATC. s3 Unlike the controller, the IFR pilot
does not know the exact position of other aircraft relative to his
own. Further, except where an emergency requires otherwise,
79 LaDawn M. Conway, Microbursts: Will Technology Ever Catch Up?, 56J. Ai L. &
COM. 263, 295 (1990).
80 In reAir Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport on Aug. 2, 1985, 919 F.2d 1079,
1085 (5th Cir.) (affirming district court's holding that "failure of the air traffic
controllers to warn a pilot of the presence of a storm... cannot be regarded as a
continuing proximate cause [of the accident] after the pilot himself discovered
its presence"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991).
81 This may change to some extent, because many aircraft are now equipped
with windshear alert or avoidance systems.
82 See Springer v. United States, 641 F. Supp. 913, 926 (D.S.C. 1986) (holding
ATC had duty to relay information to the pilot regarding weather reports of un-
usually high winds); see also Conway, supra note 79, at 296-97 (discussing impact
of TDWR System on liability).
83 See Dilk, supra note 59, at 814 (noting that "ATC has an absolute duty to
separate aircraft on IFR flight plans").
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the pilot must adhere to the clearances issued by ATC."4 Thus,
the air traffic controller has a great deal of "control" over the
aircraft despite the fact that he does not have access to the flight
controls. Consequently, it would be illogical and unfair to hold
the pilot solely responsible for flight safety in IFR conditions.
When the controller and the pilot both have access to infor-
mation regarding safety, most courts will hold that their respon-
sibilities are concurrent.85 When an aircraft is operating in VFR
conditions, however, some courts place primary responsibility
for safety on the pilot, even though the controller may be in a
better position to foresee danger. The law dealing with pilots'
responsibility for wake turbulence avoidance provides a prime
example.8 6 The FAA has determined the minimum separation
distances behind large and heavy aircraft to minimize the effects
of wake turbulence. 7 Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible
for a pilot to visually determine his exact distance behind an-
other aircraft. ATC, on the other hand, is able to determine the
exact distance between aircraft on approach and provide the
requisite separation. ATC provides the necessary separation for
IFR traffic. Once a pilot accepts clearance for a visual approach,
however, he then becomes responsible for wake turbulence
avoidance, even though ATC is still able to provide the required
separation.8 As a result, an important safety factor is eliminated
when the pilot accepts a visual approach.
IV. THE EFFECT OF FREE FLIGHT ON ATC AND
PILOT LIABILITY
In one respect, free flight will have only a limited impact on
liability because it will affect only the enroute portion of the
84 14 C.F.R. § 91.123 (a),(b) (1996); see also Captain Henk Geut, The Law: The
Pilot and the Air Traffic Controller-Division of Responsibilities, 13 AIR LAw 256, 262
(1988).
85 E.g., Daley v. United States, 792 F.2d 1081, 1085 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
ATC was negligent for failure to ascertain position of aircraft and warn of colli-
sion with antennae); Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding ATC had duty to monitor position of VFR aircraft in traffic pat-
tern and warn of impending mid-air collision).
86 "Wake turbulence" refers to the turbulence generated by an aircraft's wing-
tip vortices. The intensity of the turbulence is a factor of the weight and speed of
the aircraft and the shape of the airfoil. The vortices drift downwind behind and
below the airplane's flight path. An encounter with the wake turbulence of a
large aircraft can result in an unrecoverable upset. See AIM, supra note 13, § 7.
87 Id.
88 Id. § 5-5-12(a) (3).
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flight. At least initially, aircraft will still be under positive con-
trol during takeoff and when they reach the destination airport.
This is significant because only a small percentage of aircraft
accidents occur during the enroute phase of the flight.8 9 These
accidents are often caused by factors outside of ATC's control,
such as hazardous weather and equipment malfunction.9" Thus,
the respective responsibilities and liabilities of pilots and con-
trollers for most accidents should not be altered by the free
flight system, but in air crash cases that occur during free flight
where ATC is a factor, the courts must clarify the rules of liability
to ensure safety under the new system.
Although the technology and regulations of the free flight
program will both be new, there are some situations that exist
today which are analogous. These scenarios can provide some
insight into how the courts may treat collisions that occur in free
flight. For example, through the use of Traffic Collision Avoid-
ance Systems (TCAS) and similar equipment pilots can deter-
mine the relative position of other aircraft.91 Suppose a pilot
flying in IFR conditions receives information of an impending
collision in the form of a TCAS alert. If the pilot should ignore
the warning, or make an improper correction, he will obviously
be at least partially responsible for a resulting accident. How-
ever, if the aircraft is in contact with ATC, the controller also has
access to information regarding the potential collision. The
controller could recommend a course of action to the pilot to
avoid the collision and, indeed, has an express duty to do so
under the ATC manual which classifies a duty to warn as a "first
priority. "92
Under present law, in a majority of courts, both the controller
and the pilot would be found negligent in this scenario if the
89 According to one report, the enroute portion of flight accounted for only
5.7% of aircraft accidents between 1959 and 1995. Carole A. Shifrin, Toward Safer
Skies, 145 AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 4, 1996, at 46 (citing report of Boe-
ing Commercial Airplane Group).
90 See, e.g., Close-Up: In-Flight Icing Encounter and Loss of Control American Eagle
Flight 4184 ATR-72-21 Roselawn, Indiana, NTSB REP., Nov. 1996, at 2, 11 (stating
NTSB determined probable cause of crash of ATR-72 in holding pattern was
icing).
91 The Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) became available in the
1980s. Through this system pilots are able to monitor the position of other air-
craft. TCAS monitors the space of each aircraft and determines whether each
aircraft is climbing or descending. If it senses a potential conflict, TCAS issues an
alert. If the conflict increases, TCAS commands the pilot to either climb or de-
scend, depending on the conflicting aircraft's actions.
92 ATCM, supra note 10, § 2-1-6 n.1.
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controller failed to issue timely warnings to both aircraft and the
pilot failed to properly respond to the TCAS alert. This result is
warranted because both the pilot and the controller had the
duty and the opportunity to prevent the collision from
occurring.
Courts considering accidents which occur under free flight
should apply a similar analysis rather than revert to the tradi-
tional PIC rule. As discussed above, courts that strictly apply the
PIC rule reason that ATC should not be held liable for failing to
warn a pilot of a dangerous condition of which he knows or,
through the exercise of reasonable care, should know. With
free flight's technology, pilots will be able to "see" other aircraft,
even in IFR conditions. Thus, a court that applied the PIC rule
might not hold the controller accountable for the accident in
the hypothetical above because the pilot should have been
aware of the traffic.9"
This approach threatens aviation safety in several respects.
First, it places an unacceptable burden on the pilot whose work-
load has already been increased by advanced technology. The
technology encompassed by free flight may ultimately make it
easier for both pilots and controllers to avoid accidents.9 4 How-
ever, new technologies also create new opportunities for mis-
takes. Regardless of the quality of their training, users will make
mistakes until they become familiar with the intricacies of new
equipment.95 Moreover, recent studies indicate that advances in
technology may actually impair aviation safety by causing confu-
sion and complacency. 96
Second, and more importantly, to relieve air traffic control-
lers of all liability for their negligence would both remove an
9s Courts may analogize the situation to that of VFR flight and require pilots to
be primarily responsible to "see and avoid" other traffic. Of course, there is a vast
difference between being able to see actual aircraft in a three dimensional world
and seeing an image on a radar screen. Therefore, unlike with VFR flight, the
pilot's view of the situation will not be any clearer than ATC's view.
94 GPS will provide pilots and ATC with more precise information on the air-
craft's position. ATC will also have access to software packages that detect poten-
tial contact between aircraft alert zones and propose a course of action. Bill
Sweetman, Accelerating the ATC Revolution; Air Traffic Control 32 AIR TRANSPORT
WoRLD, May 1, 1995, at 57.
95 See, e.g., Michael A. Dornheim, Safety; Recovered FMC Memoy Puts New Spin on
Cali Accident, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 9, 1996, at 58 (stating one cause
of the B757 crash may have been crew's confusion regarding naming of way-
points in flight management system).
96 David Learmount, Unwanted Demands, FLIGHT INT'L, Oct. 9. 1996, at 26.
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important incentive that enhances air traffic safety and under-
mine public confidence in the air transport system. Holding
that a controller had no responsibility for an accident that he
watched occur and could have prevented would also be contrary
to the fundamental tenets of negligence jurisprudence. A per-
son is negligent when he fails "to do an act which is necessary
for the protection or assistance of another and which the actor
is under a duty to do."97 The duty of an air traffic controller to
act arises not just from the FARs, but also from the necessarily
dependent relationship between the pilot and controller and
the foreseeability of harm which may result from the control-
ler's conduct.98
The promotion of aviation safety is also the first and primary
responsibility of the FAA,99 which includes ATC. Simply relying
upon a pilot to avoid an accident neither satisfies a controller's
common law duty nor discharges his employer's statutory re-
sponsibility. As one commentator has noted: "[W] here the risk
is unduly great, it is not reasonable care to rely upon the respon-
sibility of others."100 That the risks inherent in aviation are "un-
duly great" is a matter beyond any reasonable dispute.
V. CONCLUSION
As the turn of the century approaches, aviation is moving into
a new era. The days of the pilot clad in leather jacket and silk
scarf while flying solo between grass fields are long gone. To-
day, flying generally involves two or more cockpit crew members
operating sophisticated aircraft equipped with complicated
software systems. The pilot must rely on many other people and
entities to accomplish his mission; foremost among these is the
air traffic control system.
With free flight, the pilot's increased responsibility for aircraft
separation will be added to the mounting tasks of monitoring
increasingly complicated software and a deluge of new informa-
tion. " To prevent accidents, it is imperative that all of those
97 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (1965); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955); Pierce v. United States, 679 F.2d 617,
621 (6th Cir. 1982).
98 SeeYates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878, 882-83 (10th Cir. 1974).
99 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (1994); see also FAA Order 1000.1A.
100 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 204
(5th ed. 1984).
101 J. Lynn Lunsford, FAA Plan May Extend Pilot Control; But Routing Proposal
Raises Safety Question, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 24, 1995, at IA.
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who can influence safety fulfill their duties. Advanced technol-
ogy should not be used as an excuse by ATC to ignore an aircraft
in potential danger, but rather as a method to more closely
monitor the aircraft's progress. Any party with access to infor-
mation that could prevent an accident must be held responsible
to air travelers. To ensure that they are, courts should abandon
the outdated PIC concept in aviation tort litigation generally;
most certainly they should not extend it to the uncharted skies
of free flight.

